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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the twenty-first century, globalization has created a world
that is interconnected and interdependent in many ways. Worldwide
integration is one of the most lasting and defining characteristics of the world
in which we live today. In fact, globalization is the primary driver behind
much of the technological, scientific, economic, and even socio-political
innovations, improvements, and developments that define today's world.
While some see this modem phenomenon as beneficial and particularly
"enrich[ing]," others are critical of the vast economic inequalities that seem
to result.' What is undeniable, however, is that globalization is a very real part
of today's world, transcending state, national, and even international borders.
Indeed, even our concept of "borders" has drastically changed. As
globalization continues to advance, territorial borders become much less
significant, most especially because one particular side effect (or perhaps the
intended effect) of globalization is that "local communities are now far more
likely to be affected by activities and entities with no local presence."2
As advances in technology, communication, and transportation make
cross-border interactions and relationships less rare and much easier, the legal
profession has responded by similarly expanding legal practice across
jurisdictional borders. Even still, the regulation of the legal profession remains
largely "state-based" in both the United States and the European Community. 3
This state-based regulation has the potential to present a unique problem in
today's globalized environment, as lawyers-largely confined within the state
where they are licensed and admitted to practice-encounter legal problems
and issues that necessarily extend across state lines.
This Article will analyze the primary systems of professional regulation
of legal practice within both the United States and the European Community.

1.
C.R., When Did Globalization Start?, THE ECONOMIST: FREEEXCHANGE (Sept. 23,
2013), https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/09/economic-history-1.

2.
Paul Schiff Berman, The GlobalizationofJurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 31819 (2002).
3.
See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979); RAMON MULLERAT, REPORT ON
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES IN EUROPE - CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
A.B.A.
(Apr.
1999),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/
commissionmultidisciplinarypractice/mulleratl.html#notel0
("The bar in Europe . . is
organised either through national bars . . . or through local bars . . . coming within a national
federation [which are then] integrated into the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the
European Community. . . ."). I use "state-based" to refer to the individual fifty states within the
"unit" of the United States, and for each Member State (country) within the "unit" of the
European Union, or more precisely, the European Community.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss2/5

2

Brown: Two Approaches to the Modern Reality of Temporary Cross-Border Le
2018]

TEMPORARY CROSS-BORDER LEGAL PRACTICE

321

Specifically, this Article will compare the professional rules that consider and
impact temporary cross-border legal practice by licensed attorneys,
highlighting how each unique approach has confronted the natural tension
existing between strong state-based regulation and the modem inevitability of
temporary cross-border legal practice. Understanding the systemic differences
and the corresponding impact is particularly important as globalization, and
correspondingly, cross-border legal practice continues to grow on a regional,
national, and international plane.
The primary motivating scenario behind this Article is how each system
deals with temporary inter-state (but intra-system) legal practice. In other
words, I attempt to illustrate how a lawyer, duly licensed and admitted to
practice in one state, (e.g., Missouri in the United States system or France in
the European Community system) may or may not-engage in the
temporary practice of law in another jurisdiction within the same system (e.g.,
Kansas or Germany, respectively).
Part II will look at the relationship between globalization and the
primarily state-based regulation of the legal profession generally within both
systems. Part III will specifically examine the systemically-limited avenues
for temporary cross-border legal practice within the United States system, and
then Part IV will analyze the less-restrictive European system that freely
allows temporary cross-border legal practice between or among Member
States. Part V explains why this comparison is important to the U.S. legal
profession, and Part VI briefly concludes.
II.

GLOBALIZATION AND STATE-BASED REGULATION

In many ways, globalization has resulted in the "internationalization" of
the practice of law. 4 Most significantly, as obstacles to inter-state trade,
communication, and travel are necessarily reduced, individuals and
companies alike-the two primary entities that hire lawyers in the first
place-frequently find themselves involved with "foreign" law, either
concerning a discrete legal issue or more generally, even if only on a
temporary basis.' As some of the biggest players in the global legal market,6

4.

See Wayne J. Carroll, Innocents Abroad: Opportunities and Challenges for the

InternationalLegal Adviser, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1097, 1099 (2001) (examining the
"internationalized" modern-day practice of law).

5.

Id. at 1103.

6.
See Global Legal Services Market Report 2017 Research and Markets,
BUSINESSWIRE (May 4, 2017, 9:59 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/

20170504005920/en/Global-Legal-Services-Market-Report-2017

(stating that in 2016, the

United States accounted for forty-five percent of the $645 billion global legal services market
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the legal systems of the United States and Europe are particularly
significant a status that only grows as the nature of the practice of law begins
to change from being primarily localized to more broad, far-reaching, and
expansive. Thus, as the globalized nature of the legal practice continues, the
regulation of lawyers becomes a much more salient and important factor,
having greater implications than ever before.
In the United States, even as clients' inter-state relationships and issues
continue to grow, the states themselves have principally retained their
monopoly over the regulation of the legal profession. 7 Even the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that state-by-state regulation is a long-standing
tradition within the United States legal system: "[s]ince the founding of the
Republic, the licensing and regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to
the States .... " In addition to being a natural by-product of federalism and
notions of state sovereignty, the particularized and fragmented system of legal
regulation resulted, in due part, because of the traditional locally-confined
nature of lawyering, as well as strong protectionist tendencies of the
individual states emanating from the state-based federalism upon which the
United States was founded. 9
Comparatively, the professional regulation of lawyers within the
European Union occurs primarily from within the sub-parts of the whole. In
essence, the national bars within each individual Member State have the
authority to-and do in fact regulate the legal profession.' 0 State-based
regulation within Europe is particularly significant and meaningful because
most of the trade of services within the European Community occurs primarily
among (with) other Member States."

while the United Kingdom, France, and Germany accounted for an additional fourteen percent
(about $90 billion)).
7.
See Eli Wald, FederalizingLegal Ethics, NationalizingLaw Practice, andthe Future
of the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 498-99 (2011).
8. Leis, 439 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
9.
See Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 285 n.18 (1985) ("Many of the
states that have erected fences against out-of-state lawyers have done so primarily to protect
their own lawyers from professional competition.") (quoting Chesterfield Smith, Time for a
NationalPractice of Law Act, 64 A.B.A. J. 557, 557 (1978)); AM. BAR. Ass'N, 2002 REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 7.
10. See AM. BAR. Ass'N, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that lawyers may easily establish law

practices in different member states).
11. See Trade in Goods & Services, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: SINGLE MARKET
SCOREBOARD
(July
11,
2018),
http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/scoreboard/
integration market openness/trade_goodsservices/indexen.htm. For instance, in 2015, all but
five European Union Member States imported more services from other EU Member States than
non-EU Member States, and similarly with the exception of four EU Member States more
services were exported to fellow Member States than non-EU states. Id
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In both legal systems-although to differing degrees-states have
traditionally implemented rules that allow only duly licensed and admitted
lawyers to practice within their borders. In the United States, "unauthorized
practice of law" (UPL) rules generally prohibit legal practice without first
being licensed to do so within that state.' 2 Similarly, various national bars
within the European Community have established rules that require national
residency in order to appear before certain courts, and they have allowed the
establishment of only one legal chamber.1 3 However, as discussed below, the
foundational principles of "unity" and "integration" of the European
Community have led to a much more understanding and non-prohibitive
regulatory scheme for cross-border legal practice.14
III. TEMPORARY MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

While the individual fifty states do have wide latitude and discretion for
the regulation of the legal profession including developing and applying UPL
rules," these rules and regulations must ultimately be confined by the
constraints and protections of the U.S. Constitution.' 6 However, while the
Supreme Court has firmly established the principle that the practice of law

12. See generally Christine R. Davis, Approaching Reform: The Future of
MultiurisdictionalPractice in Today's Legal Profession, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1339, 1341
(2002) (defining unauthorized practice of law as "when a lawyer licensed in his or her home
state crosses state boundaries to handle legal matters in state where he or she is not licensed");
La Tanya James & Siyeon Lee, Adapting the UnauthorizedPractice of Law Provisions to
Modern Legal Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1137-39 (2001) (discussing rules
governing out-of-state practice of law).
13. See Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur Van de Bedrijfsvereniging Voor de
Metaalnijverheid (Bd. Trade Ass'n Eng'g Indus.), 1974 E.C.R. 1299, 1301 (examining a
Netherlands law requiring "only persons established in the Netherlands can act as legal
representatives or advisers" before the Central Appeals Board); Case 107/83, Paris Bar Ass'n v.
Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. 2972, 2973 (Paris Bar Council allowing an avocat (lawyer) to establish
chambers in one place only within the jurisdiction of the regional court -effectively not
allowing bar-membership in another foreign bar).
14. See, e.g., Melissa Pender, MultiurisdictionalPracticeandAlternativeLegal Practice
Structures: Learning from EU Liberalization to Implement Appropriate Legal Regulatory
Reforms in the UnitedStates, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1575, 1582-83 (2014).
15. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (explaining that the licensing and
regulation of lawyers has widely been left exclusively to the states).
16. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. ex rel Va. St. B., 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (citing NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware
v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957)) (recognizing that "Virginia
undoubtedly has broad powers to regulate the practice of law within its borders; but . . a State
cannot ignore the rights of individuals secured by the Constitution"); Silverman v. Browning,
414 F. Supp. 80, 85-86 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 429 U.S. 876 (1976).
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itself is protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause,' 7 there has been
only minimal guidance concerning permanent cross-state practice (i.e., being
admitted to another state's bar), and no direction by the Supreme Court
concerning constitutional issues surrounding the regulation of temporary
cross-border legal practice. " Thus, while the Court has specifically
recognized, in the more limited context of a state residency requirement for
the state bar, that "[t]he lawyer's role in the national economy" necessitates,
in part, that the practice of law is a "fundamental right" under Article IV of
the Constitution, the practice of law generally is not an unlimited, ubiquitous,
or absolute right.1 9 As we will see, although the national economic importance
of lawyers aids the Court in constitutionally limiting what states may require
for bar admission applicants,20 it is not so strong unlike within the European
Community as to open practice-borders for lawyers on a temporary basis on
Constitutional, statutory, or other grounds.
Most of the individual U.S. states continue to regulate temporary crossborder legal practice primarily through UPL rules.2' Broadly interpreted and
increasingly expansively applied UPL rules generally prohibit the "temporary
practice of an out-of-state lawyer without proper authorization." 22 Originally,
state bars implemented such UPL rules as a form of both consumer and
economic protection. 23 Essentially, states relied on their own individual
licensing exams and admissions requirements to ensure that the lawyers
practicing within their jurisdiction were competent in the particular state's law
and would provide capable, efficient, and skilled legal services. 24
Historically, when the practice of law was naturally constrained to local
or regional spheres by limitations in technology, communication, and

17. See Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279-82 (1985).
18. See Alessandro Turina, Temporary Interstate TransactionalPractice in the United
States andEurope Keeping up with Modern CommercialRealities, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 225, 226, 227-29 (2005) (examining Supreme Court Privileges and Immunities
jurisprudence relating to cross-border legal practice).
19. See Piper, 470 U.S. at 281-85 (recognizing only that the state's rule excluding bar
admission nonresidents was a violation of the Privileges and Immunities secured by the
Constitution).
20. See id. at 282.
21. See, e.g., Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4-5.5 (2017) (providing that "[a] lawyer shall not practice
law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that
jurisdiction. .. .").
22. James W. Jones et al., Reforming Lawyer Mobility Protecting Turf or Serving
Clients?, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 142 (2017).
23. See Davis, supra note 12, at 1344.
24. See id. (recognizing that, originally, states "assume[d] . . that lawyers who have not
fulfilled a state's admissions requirements are not competent to practice law within that state"
as a form of consumer protection).
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infrastructure (notwithstanding federal law), these laws were of little
consequence. 25 However, as the nature of law and legal practice continues to
become less spatially or geographically-restricted alongside great advances
and innovation in technology and infrastructure, state-based UPL rules
become particularly important having potentially significant consequences.
For instance, how narrowly or expansively a state-or rather a state supreme
court-defines what constitutes the "practice of law" in the context of its UPL
rules, largely determines how easy it may be to violate (knowingly or
unwittingly) the general rule against temporary cross-border legal practice.
In 2016, for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed discipline
imposed by the Minnesota state bar on a Colorado-licensed attorney for the
unauthorized practice of law.26 The state bar, and subsequently the Minnesota
Supreme Court, determined that the lawyer had engaged in the practice of law
when he participated in a settlement negotiation through e-mail.27 Although
the Colorado-based lawyer was never physically present within the state, and
indeed only had a "virtual" presence by communicating with Minnesota
citizens through the internet, the Minnesota Supreme Court found the lawyer
had violated the state's UPL statute because he practiced law in the state of
Minnesota without holding a Minnesota law license. 28 Although only a private
admonition was imposed by the court for the UPL violation, 29 such a
determination can result, in addition to state bar sanctions and other
disciplinary action, in the withholdings of compensation for the legal services
provided.30

25. See Jack A. Guttenberg, PracticingLaw in the Twenty-First Century in a Twentieth
(Nineteenth) Century Straightjacket:Something Has to Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 415, 42122.
26. In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel File No. 39302, 884 N.W.2d 661,
663 (Minn. 2016).
27. Id
28. Id. at 665, 666 (recognizing that under the state's UPL rules, "[c]ertainly, physical
presence is one way to practice law in a jurisdiction. But . . it is not the only way" and thereby
finding that the dispute involved only Minnesota legal issues and Minnesota clients, the attorney
accordingly violated the state's UPL statute through online legal services).
29. Id at 669.
30. See Ranta v McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161, 164 (N.D. 1986) (holding, based upon the
state's UPL statutes, "an out-of-State attorney who is not licensed to practice law in this State
cannot recover compensation for services rendered in th[is] State"); Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d
329, 330-31 (N.Y. 1965) (reversing the lower court's order awarding judgment for an out-ofstate lawyer who had sued to recover compensation for work performed, and recognizing that
"[t]his was an illegal transaction and . . we refuse to aid in it" because the illegal (unlicensed)
practice of law was not a "single isolated incident," but was fairly characterized as the "practice
of law").
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In a similar case, the California Supreme Court broadly asserted that
"[p]hysical presence here is one factor we may consider in deciding whether
the unlicensed lawyer has violated [the UPL rule], but it is by no means
exclusive." 31 In other words, so long as the unlicensed legal practice (i.e.,
cross-border legal practice) is connected to a "California client on California
law in connection with a California legal dispute," it is a UPL violation,
whether or not the lawyer was physically or only virtually "present." 32
Partly in response to the Birbrower court's decision, the American Bar
Association's Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice amended the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to reflect an understanding of the
important consequences the then-existing state-based UPL statutes could
potentially have in a modern system characterized by an increased arguably
necessarily so-incidence of temporary cross-border legal practice. 33
A.

Amended Model Rule ofProfessionalConduct 5.5(c): An Expansion
of Temporary Cross-BorderLegal Practicein the United States

Prior to 2002, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)
provided only that: "A lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where
doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or
(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law." 34 Today, even
though the broad and largely discretionary state-based authority to define
what exactly constitutes the practice of law within a UPL rule persists,

35

there

is, at the same time, a growing acceptance of the need to embrace the
contemporary reality of temporary inter-state legal practice.
With this in mind, the 2002 ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional
Practice (the Commission) amended Rule 5.5 to specifically reflect this
recognition by creating a new exception to the traditional UPL rule, which
had effectively prohibited cross-border legal practice altogether. In particular,
the Commission stated that the primary driving force behind the amended rule
was the "dynamic change and evolution in nature and scope of legal practice

31. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cty.,
949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1998).
32. Id. at 5-6.
33. See AM. BAR. Ass'N, supra note 9, at 3-4.
34. Id. at 16 (striking through language omitted in the 2002 amendment and underlining
language added in the amendment).
35. See, e.g., Simons v. Steverson, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 208-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that a California-licensed attorney residing in New York engaged in the practice of law
in California by reviewing, negotiating, and completing a sales agent and distribution agreement
with respect to parties residing in California).
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during the past century," an explicit recognition of the influence and
pervasiveness of modem globalization on both the practical and the
intellectual levels of law (e.g., that of actual legal practice and the "law"
itself). 36

By adopting Amended Rule 5.5,37 the ABA created a "safe harbor" for
temporary inter-state (i.e., cross-border) legal practice. 38 Under this expanded
rule, entitled "Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of
Law," temporary cross-border legal practice is now generally allowed within
the forty-seven states who have adopted Rule 5.5(c) with their own very
similar or identical state rules. 39 Pursuant to MRPC 5.5(c), temporary cross-

border legal practice is permitted as an exception to the general rule against
unauthorized practice of law under four discrete and specific contexts: (1)
When working closely in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice
in the host-state and who "actively participates" in the representation; (2)
When the legal services are "ancillary" to litigation where the lawyer is either
already admitted or expects to be admitted pro hac vice; (3) When the legal
services arise in the alternative-dispute-resolution context so long as they
"arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice" in a jurisdiction
in which they are admitted to practice; or (4) Non-litigation work that "arises
out of or is reasonably related to" the lawyer's home-state (i.e., duly licensed)
practice.40

Specifically, the ABA Commission intended these amendments to
"facilitate multijurisdictional law practice in identifiable situations that serve
the interests of clients and the public and do not create an unreasonable
regulatory risk [for the states]." 4' Thus, under this modern framework, while
the general prohibition against unlicensed cross-border legal practice still

36. AM. BAR. Ass'N, supra note 9, at 3.
37. See Rex R. Perschbacher, Lawyers and Ethical Issues/Considerations in CrossBorder Class Action Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 735, 738 ("In August 2002, the ABA
House of Delegates adopted all nine recommendations (as amended)," including the
Commission's amendments to Model Rule 5.5).
38. Robert E. Lutz et al., TransnationalLegal Practice Developments, 39 INT'L LAW.
619, 633 (2005).
39. See AM. BAR. Ass'N, State Implementation of ABA Model Rule 5.5
(Multiurisdictional Practice of
Law)
(May
16,
2016),
https://www.amer
icanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional responsibility/quickguide_5_5 .auth
checkdam.pdf.
40. AM. BAR. Ass'N, supra note 9, at 6; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.5(c)
(AM. BAR Ass'N 2002).
41. REP. OF THE COMMISSION ON MJP, supra note 9, at 20-21.
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temporary cross-border legal practice is now permitted within the

vast majority of the States under certain circumstances and certain situations.
B.

The Limited Realities of Temporary Cross-BorderLegal Practice in
the United States

While the new Rule 5.5(c) does permit temporary cross-border legal
practice, it does so only in a very limited sense. First, cross-border legal
practice within the United States is limited by the inherent nature of the
temporary legal practice that is allowed pursuant to Rule 5.5(c). In other
words, the cross-border practice in the host state must not be (or become) the
practice of law that may be characterized as "systematic and continuous." 43
While the Model Rules leave this as an undefined and generally ambiguous
conceptual limitation to be interpreted by the states in constructing their own
rules,

44

practicing lawyers who are thrust into cross-border legal practice by

the nature of their client's situation must carefully consider the ambiguous
gray-area existing between "temporary" cross-border legal practice which is
permitted and an improper "regular," "established," or "systematic and
continuous" legal practice. 45 This consideration is particularly important as a
practical matter, especially considering the severe consequences of
unauthorized legal practice, including state bar sanctions, disciplinary action,
and even forfeiting compensation for legal services rendered.
Some courts, however, have provided limited guidance for determining
when a legal practice may fairly be considered only temporary. For instance,
some courts have conceptualized this standard as one based upon notions of
the quantity and frequency of one's legal practice. In Disabled Patriots of
America, Inc. v. HT West End, LLC, the district court held that the out-of-state
lawyers were necessarily "approaching a continuous and systematic presence"
after discovering that the lawyers had filed seven cases within the same district

42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.5(a) ("A lawyer shall not practice law
in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist
another in doing so.").
43. Id. at cmt. 5.
44. See id. at cmt. 6, which states:
There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer's services are provided on
a "temporary basis"....
Services may be "temporary" even though the lawyer
provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended
period of time, as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy
negotiation or litigation").
45. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, MultiurisdictionalPractice and the Influence of Model
Rule ofProfessional Conduct 5.5 An Interim Assessment, 43 AKRON L. REV. 729, 734 (2010)
(citing AM. BAR. Ass'N, supra note 9, at 26.).
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in the preceding two years, thereby violating the natural limitation based on
the plain language of the statute-i.e., what plainly constitutes temporary
cross-border legal practice. 46 Thus, while permitted, temporary cross-border
legal practice is made difficult and is inherently limited due to the ambiguity
and the court-by-court nature that result from such an open-ended conceptual
standard, itself further restraining temporary cross-border legal practice in the
United States.
Second, under Rule 5.5(c)(1), a lawyer may provide temporary crossborder legal services so long as the lawyer actively associates with a lawyer
duly licensed to practice law in the forum state. While the MRPC similarly
leaves "active participation" fundamentally undefined, 47 states have generally
applied this standard in their own rules based on the plain language to require
that the host-state lawyer significantly participate. 48 In other words, the dulylicensed lawyer must be involved more than by name only, playing a large
role in the legal proceedings. 49
Alternatively, some courts-in implementing their own rules of
professional conduct have construed this requirement more liberally. For
example, the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio interpreted
"active participation" as only requiring that the in-state lawyer take "final
responsibility for the pleading, motion or brief," effectively allowing the outof-state lawyer to primarily draft the documents or participate in the legal
proceedings within the confines of allowable cross-border legal practice.50 On
the other hand, other courts have enforced a more practice-restrictive view by

46. Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v. HT W. End, LLC, No. 1:04 CV 3216 JEC, 2006 WL
449152, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2006).
47. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 8 (qualifying the "active
participation" requirement of MRPC 5.5(c)(1) by requiring "share[d] responsibility for the
representation of the client").
48. See Greenbaum, supra note 45, at 733-34 (noting that "a number of the terms used
in the rule to differentiate proper from improper multijurisdictional conduct were purposefully
left vague"). But see Armor v. Lantz, 535 S.E.2d 737, 745-46 (W. Va. 2000) (holding that the
local association requirement of the District Court was "ambiguous as to the precise
responsibilities of local counsel" and "does not necessarily require that local counsel take equal
charge of preparing and prosecuting a case").
49. Greenbaum, supra note 45, at 743; see S.C. Ethics Advisory Opinion 93-35 (1993)
(noting "[t]he [in-state] lawyer may not serve merely as a conduit for the out-of-state lawyer,
but must be jointly responsible for the representation of the [in-state] client"); Utah Ethics
Opinion No. 17-04 (2017) (noting, "[a]cting as local counsel for a pro hac vice attorney is not a
minor or perfunctory undertaking" and local association requires the in-state attorney acting
"more than [as] a mail drop or messenger" for the out-of-state lawyer).
50. HSBC Bank USA v. Cline, Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-00978, 2013 WL 5775362, at
*2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2013). Although this is a federal district court rather than a state court, it
remains instructive as to how courts in general may interpret or construe the vague standard that
exists of what activeparticipationmay mean.
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requiring the host-state lawyer to provide a greater contribution in a more
dynamic role throughout the proceedings." Ultimately, although it has not
provided any guidance on what it actually means (perhaps due to the inherent
federalist-nature of these requirements), the United States Supreme Court has
upheld as constitutionally valid these kinds of local association
requirements.5 2

Third, out-of-state lawyers may temporarily gain pro hac vice admission
before a specific court or tribunal.5 3 Prohac vice refers to the process in which
out-of-state lawyers must file a motion with a local court asking permission
to appear before that court in a jurisdiction in which they are not licensed to
practice law on a specific matter or in a specific case.5 4 However, this
particular safe harbor for cross-border practice is fundamentally limited only
to the realm of litigation practice as no comparable process exists for
transactional, commercial, or any other non-litigation-related legal practice
that does not appear before a judicial body.
Furthermore, as the 2002 ABA Commission recognized, even without the
express inclusion of this exception, "every jurisdiction permits pro hac vice
admission of out-of-state lawyers appearing before a tribunal," although the

51. See Gsell v. Rubin & Yates, LLC, 41 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing
Bilazzo v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J. 2012)) (following a
five-factor test to determine whether the lawyer actively participated or merely consulted: (1)
having no direct contact with any client; (2) having limited contact with opposing counsel; (3)
neither signing nor drafting a substantial portion of the pleadings and motions; (4) participating
only by "reviewing motions, preparing memos, editing documents, discussing litigation
strategy . . .and conducting legal research"; and (5) "record[ing] only a modest number of
hours" as compared to lead counsel); DisabledPatriots ofAm., Inc., 2006 WL 449152, at *4
(requiring "more than 1.5 hours of work expended reviewing the Complaint and Settlement
Agreement, drafting one letter, and participating in a twenty-minute phone conference").
52. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1961) (per curiam) (citing Phelps v. Bd. of
Educ. of W. N.Y., 300 U.S. 319, 324 (1937)) (holding that requiring out-of-state counsel to
associate with local counsel does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
protections).
53.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.5(c)(2); Greenbaum, supra note 45, at 744-

45.
54. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1979) ("[T]he practice of courts in most States
is to allow an out-of-state lawyer the privilege of appearing upon motion.").
55. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cty.,
949 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Cal. 1998) (transactional attorney prosecuted by the state bar for unauthorized
practice of law by an out-of-state lawyer); AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 9, at 9-10 (noting there
is "no counterpart to pro hac vice admission" for "transactional and counseling practices, and
other work outside court or agency proceedings" even though "multijurisdictional law practice
is common" for these practitioners as well); Pender, supra note 14, at 1598 (citing AM. BAR
ASS'N, supra note 9, at 2) (recognizing that "[a]lthough litigators have long been allowed to
engage in MJP by pro hac vice admission in certain limited situations, traditionally transactional
lawyers had not been afforded any such leeway" despite feeling the same globalization factors).
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exact processes, standards, and requirements vary among jurisdictions and
even from court to court.56 Thus, Rule 5.5(c)(2) effectively allows and
endorses the continued utilization of pro hac vice admission within the context
of temporary cross-border legal practice without "supplant[ing] [existing] pro
hac vice requirements" for each individual state or court.57 Generally, pro hac
vice admission is construed strictly as a highly discretionary58 and limited
"privilege" 59 that may be subject to exacting procedural requirements. 60
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court noted that under Ohio's UPL and
MJP rules (very similar in substance to Rule 5.5),61 the approval of a pro hac
vice application is "expressly consign[ed] ... to the discretion of the trial
court" and is not a protected interest under either the Ohio constitution or the
U.S. Constitution. 62

Most states typically require the out-of-state lawyer seeking pro hac vice
status to: (1) Prove good standing within their own state bar; (2) Associate
with a host-state-licensed attorney; (3) Demonstrate lack of any "substantial
relation with the forum state"; (4) Only have limited pro hac vice appearances;
and (5) Recognize that the "court[] retain[s] broad discretion to revoke their
admission." 63 However, these standards may (and do) change from court to
court and among jurisdictions. For instance, the United States District Court
for Puerto Rico has held that under the plain meaning of pro hac vice (plainly
translated as meaning: "[flor this occasion or particular purpose"), an out-ofstate counsel who had appeared pro hac vice six times in the preceding two
years was deemed ineligible to appear pro hac vice. 64 Alternatively, other

56. AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 9, at 9.
57. Id. at 23.
58. See Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80, 88 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 429 U.S. 876
(1976) (applying a liberal "abuse of discretion" standard to a state court's decision regarding
pro hac vice applications).
59. See Note, Retaining Out-Of-State Counsel: The Evolution of a Federal Right, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 731, 735 (1967) (stating that out-of-state lawyers admitted on a pro hac vice
status are "typically restricted to making court appearances and performing other functions
directly related to a particular pending case").
60. See, e.g., In re Ferrey, 774 A.2d 62, 64 (R.I. 2001) (claiming the "exclusive and
ultimate authority to determine who may, and may not be permitted to practice law in this state"
and therefore that only the Rhode Island Supreme Court had the authority to grant pro hac vice
admissions to out-of-state lawyers appearing temporarily before any "municipal or state agency,
board or commission").
61. See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 39, at 3.
62. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443 (1979); see also Roma Constr. Co. v. Russo, 96 F.3d
566, 576-77 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 651 n.13 (1987)).
63. Clint Eubanks, Student Commentary, Can I Conduct This Case in Another State? A
Survey ofState Pro Hac Vice Admission, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 145, 147 (2004).
64. Mateo v. Empire Gas Co., 841 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579, 581 (D.P.R. 2012).
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states vaguely apply a non-quantifiable standard, leaving pro hac vice
admission virtually to the court's unfettered discretion.65 Consequently, while
pro hac vice admission is a somewhat accessible avenue for litigators to utilize
in cross-border legal practice-especially in the courts that view pro hac vice
admission as a "matter of course" and "normally routine"6 6-it is inherently
limited both by any particular requirements of the state bar or local courts, 67
as well as, again, the innate limitations within the very concept of engaging in
temporary cross-border legal practice.
Lastly, temporary cross-border legal practice is generally permitted by the
MRPC under a nexus requirement. Particularly, so long as the legal
representation is "reasonably related" to either alternative dispute resolutions
arising out of the lawyer's home-state practice or temporary activities simply
arising out of the lawyer's home-state practice, a sufficient nexus exists and
temporary cross-border legal practice is allowed. 68 Factors that demonstrate a
"reasonable nexus" include: a pre-existing lawyer-client relationship, the
client residing in or having substantial contacts with the lawyer's own homestate, or that the legal matter has a "significant connection" with the hoststate.69
Particularly informative to this exception to the general rule banning
cross-border legal practice-temporary or otherwise-in the United States is
In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel File No. 39302, in which
the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected an out-of-state lawyer's claim that his
services within Minnesota did not violate the state's UPL rules.

70

Specifically,

the lawyer asserted that his practice was valid within the meaning of
Minnesota's version of the Rule 5.5 exception. 7 ' He argued that Minnesota
citizens (coincidently the lawyer's in-laws) had hired him to settle a debt

65. See ARIZ. CT. R. 39(e) ("Absent special circumstances, repeated appearances by any
person pursuant to this [pro hac vice] rule may be the cause for denial of the motion . . . .").
66. See William T. Barker, ExtrajurisdictionalPractice by Lawyers, 56 Bus. LAW. 1501,
1525-26 (2001).
67. See Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80, 82-83, 88 (D. Conn. 1976) (upholding
as constitutional the discretionary pro hac vice admission rule of Connecticut state court that
required: (1) Good standing in another state; (2) A "special and infrequent occasion" and "good
cause" demonstrated by long standing attorney-client relationship, specialized skill and
knowledge, or that the client is unable to secure Connecticut counsel for representation; and (3)
That duly-licensed Connecticut attorney must "be present at all proceedings and must sign all
[filed papers] and assume full responsibility for them").
68. See Greenbaum, supra note 45, at 746-48.
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 14; see generally Jones, supra
note 22, at 131-33 (exploring variations on what reasonably related means within the context of
individual states).
70. 884 N.W.2d 661, 667-68 (Minn. 2016).
71. See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 39, at 2.
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dispute-an area of law his primarily environmental law practice had
encountered before and, as a result, his activities in Minnesota plainly
"arose out of [his] law practice."72 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court
disagreed. The court held that because the lawyer's clients were "Minnesota
residents with a debt that arose in Minnesota that they owed to a Minnesota
resident and that was governed by Minnesota law," regardless of his
professional expertise or prior experience with this kind of legal practice
(which in reality was not a lot), his legal practice in Minnesota did not, in fact,
sufficiently "arise out of' his Colorado law practice to constitute a lawful
exercise of the temporary cross-border legal practice exception.73
Even with the conscious expansion of the rules of professional conduct
and professional regulation to account for modem multijurisdictional legal
issues, temporary cross-border legal practice within the United States remains
a limited exception rather than the general rule. Although certainly it is more
frequently allowed under these rules than perhaps it has been historically,74 it
remains fundamentally limited by the inherent constraints of what temporary
means, as well as the Model Rule's express limitations requiring either active
local association, pro hac vice admission, or a sufficient nexus.
IV.

TEMPORARY
COMMUNITY

MULTIJURISDICTIONAL

PRACTICE

IN

THE

EUROPEAN

While the magnitude or actual quantity of European law concerning
cross-border legal practice is more limited than within the United States, the
regulation of temporary multijurisdictional legal practice is, at the same time,
much narrower and more limited in application, demonstrating a greater
acknowledgement and acceptance of the modem necessity of temporary
cross-border legal practice. Put succinctly, the European Community not only
encourages, but actively protects the very provision of temporary cross-border
legal services by lawyers of any of the Member States.
Fundamentally, Member States within the European Community's legal
system have much less discretion in the realm of cross-border practice than

72.

In re Charges of UnprofessionalConduct in Panel File No. 39302, 884 N.W.2d at

667.
73. Id. at 668-69.
74. See, e.g., Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329, 330-31 (N.Y. 1965) (noting "[i]t is settled
that the practice of law forbidden in this State by [NY's UPL law] to all but duly licensed New
York attorneys includes legal advice and counsel as well as appearing in the courts," and only
exceptions for "out-of-State lawyers to appear in our courts on occasion or even be admitted to
practice here . . . [but under] express permission of the court and always on recommendation of
a member of our Bar"); Perschbacher, supra note 37, at 753.
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their United States counterparts. Similar to the overriding nature of the
Constitution within the legal framework of the United States which, as of
yet, has not been applied to substantively limit the general rule against crossborder practice temporary or otherwise-at the core of the European legal
framework is the Treaty of Rome of 1957 (EEC Treaty). The EEC Treaty
established the European Economic Community, intended to "lay the
foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe." 7 5
As such, the European Union-and its core of the European
Community has traditionally existed and endured with the specified and
intentional purpose of promoting a greater freedom of inter-state movement
of services, persons, goods, and capital. 76 To this end, a series of amendments
to the EEC Treaty in the late twentieth-century continued to implement
programs specifically to advance the European Community's interest in an
"integrated internal market," 77 or more specifically, "an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital
is ensured." 7 Ultimately, the impact of this underlying framework of
expansive inter-state comity and integration on the regulation of European
lawyers is two-fold. First, at the core of the European Community as laid
out by the EEC Treaty is both the right and the freedom to provide services,
which, second, paves the way for an actively integrated legal system with a
greater conception of "open borders," most especially in terms of temporary
cross-border legal practice. 79
A.

European Community Law: Clearingthe Way for Temporary CrossBorderLegal Practice

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has firmly established the principle
that "each Member State is free to regulate the .

.

. legal profession within its

75. D. Bruce Shine, The European Union's Lack of Internal Borders in the Practice of
Law: A Modelfor the UnitedStates?, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 207, 209 (2002) (citing
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957 [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]). The European Community, as the "core [political and legal system] of the European
Union," is the inter-governmental, internationally recognized legal entity of the European
Member States. Roger J. Goebel, The LiberalizationofInterstateLegal Practicein the European
Union: Lessons for the UnitedStates?, 34 INT'L LAW. 307, 307 n.2 (2000).
76. Turina, supra note 18, at 231.
77. See Roger J. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community: Progress Towards
Community-Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 556, 559-60 (1991) (citing The
Single European Act of July 1, 1987, art. 8a).
78. Id. at 560.
79. See id. Although not unlimited, as we will see, the European System is undoubtedly
more open and accepting of cross-border legal practice than the United States.
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territory," but only in the absence of European Union (or European
Community) law.so In effect, where it exists, European Community law takes
precedence over the national laws of Member States, as is the case within the
context of the legal profession. While somewhat similar to the state-based
professional regulation of lawyers in United States, the reality for European
Community Member States is much different. Due to the regionally-focused
European program of economic integration-including, as a subpart,
professional integration the European Community actively imposes
supranational European law on Member States specifically regarding
professional regulations. Comparatively, neither the U.S. Constitution nor the
U.S. Supreme Court have firmly established any kind of particular
constitutional guidelines regarding temporary cross-border legal practice
(other than under general constitutional considerations for the legal profession
as a whole).
At the core of the European Community, the EEC Treaty (binding upon
the assenting Member States) unequivocally asserts-as undeniable rights
both the freedom of movement and the freedom to provide services. First,
Article 59 broadly mandates that Member States abolish "restrictions on
freedom to provide services within the Community."" Article 60 further
extends this freedom, specifically directing that providers of "services,"
defined as including "activities of the professions," shall have the right to
"temporarily pursue his activity in the State where the service is provided." 82
Accordingly, all Member States consider lawyers and the legal profession to
be within this protected class of "professionals," and as a result, lawyers have
the rights of professionals and of services providers as established under the
EEC Treaty. 83 Additionally, and even more specifically, Member States are
required to hold the temporary cross-border legal services provider to the
"same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals." 84

80. Case 107/83, Paris Bar Ass'n v. Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. 2972, 2989.
81. EEC Treaty, supra note 75, at art. 59 (re-numbered as art. 49 under the Treaty of
Amsterdam, May 1, 1999). To avoid confusion, I will be using the numeration under the
original EEC Treaty of 1957. For a complete re-numbering of the EEC Treaty in the 1999
Treaty of Amsterdam, see EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, TABLE OF EQUIVALENCIES, TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM 85-91, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf.
82. EEC Treaty, supra note 75, at art. 60; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union art. 56, Oct. 26,2012,2008 O.J. C 115 ("[R]estrictions
on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of
Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom
the services are intended.").
83. Goebel, supra note 77, at 566.
84. EEC Treaty, supra note 75, at art. 60.
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Under Article 60, the distinction between temporary services and
established (or permanent) services is, like in the United States, a particularly
significant limitation on cross-border legal practice. Interestingly, both the
United States and the European systems have left this concept largely
undefined and are satisfied to merely contrast it with a similarly vague
"continuous," "permanent," or "established" legal practice." However, the
ECJ has suggested, at least in the European context, a much more liberal
interpretation of this distinction than in the United States: "[T]he temporary
nature of the activities ... has to be determined in the light, not only of the
duration of the provision of the service, but also of its regularity, periodicity
or continuity." 8 6 Additionally, the court considered that the inherent limits of
having a temporary practice did not in fact preclude an out-of-state lawyer
from "equip[ping] himself with some form of infrastructure in the host
Member State (including an office, chambers or consulting rooms)" pursuant
to his representation and provision of temporary legal services. 87
Of utmost importance, in 1975, the ECJ held that both Article 59 and
Article 60 were directly applicable to Member States, thereby having a direct
effect in the national courts of Member States." As a result, any citizen of any
Member State could rely on either, or both, Articles 59 and 60 to engage in
and provide temporary cross-border professional services in any other
Member State.89 Ultimately, the freedom to provide services within the
European Community is the foundation and the very core of the European
right to temporary cross-border legal practice. 90
In addition to the EEC Treaty itself, Article 189 of the Treaty allows for
the European Commission to issue "directives" to implement the goals and
principles of the EEC Treaty.91 Such directives are binding on Member States

85. But see Goebel, supra note 77, at 607-08 (suggesting that the line between temporary
and a more permanent legal practice lies somewhere within determining the "line of
demarcation between providing a service and [actual] establishment" of which the former
implies occasional activities and the latter suggests some degree of permanence).
86. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di
Milano (Council of the Order of Lawyers and Procurators of Milan), 1995 E.C.R. 1-4186, I4195.
87. Id.
88. See Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur Van de Bedrijfsvereniging Voor de
Metaalnijverheid (Board of the Business Association for the Metal Industry), 1974 E.C.R. 1300,
1304-05.
89. See Goebel, supra note 75, at 311 (citing Van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. at 1311-12);
see also Goebel, supra note 77, at 567 (citing Comm'n v. France, Case 167/73, 1974 E.C.R.
359) (recognizing the effect of the ECJ holding that articles 59 and 60 have direct effect as being
"immediately binding in Member States regardless of the existence of any national legislation").
90. See Goebel, supra note 77, at 566.
91. EEC Treaty, supra note 75, at art. 189.
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only "as to the result to be achieved," thereby allowing individual Member
States to exercise discretion as to the "form and methods" utilized in actually
executing the directives. 92 Pursuant to this authority, in 1977, the European
Commission implemented Council Directive No. 77/249 to Facilitate the
Effective Exercise by Lawyers ofFreedom to Provide Services (the Lawyers'
Services Directive). 93 Still in force today, 94 the Lawyers' Services Directive,
in effect, implements the EEC Treaty's freedom to provide services
specifically as to lawyers, setting forth specific guidelines and principles for
the acceptance and promotion of temporary cross-border legal practice within
and throughout the European Community. 95
Ultimately, the Lawyers' Services Directive, with one exception, 96
decidedly permits the temporary cross-border legal practice of Member State
lawyers within other Member States with only a few qualifications. 97 First,
Article 1 of the Directive specifically identifies the legal professionals in each
country who are entitled and permitted to engage in cross-border legal
practice. 98 Second, the Directive places three main conditions on the exercise
of the right to provide cross-border legal services: 99 (1) lawyers engaged in
cross-border legal practice must retain and use the professional title of their
home state; 00 (2) lawyers engaged in cross-border legal practice involving
"representation of a client in legal proceedings or before public authorities"
are subject to the host-state's professional rules and conditions with the
exception of residency or professional registration requirements;.0. and (3)

92. Id.
93. See Goebel, supra note 77, at 576; Council Directive 77/249 to Facilitate the Effective
Exercise by Lawyers of Freedom to Provide Services, 1977 O.J. (L 78/17) [hereinafter Lawyers'
Services
Directive],
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%/`3A
31977LO249 (adding to the list of recognized "lawyers" when last amended in 2013 legal
professionals from several countries).
94. See Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 93.
95. See Pender, supra note 14, at 1586; Goebel, supra note 75, at 312 (discussing in detail
the 1977 Lawyers' Services Directive provisions).
96. See Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 93, at art. 1(1) (allowing Member States
to "reserve to prescribed categories of lawyers" the legal practice of preparing formal documents
concerning real estate transactions or the administration of estates).
97. See Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 93, id. at art. 1-2; Goebel, supra note
75, at 312, 339.
98. Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 93, at art. 1(2); see Goebel, supra note 75,
at 312 (discussing the Lawyers' Services Directive).
99. See Goebel, supra note 75, at 337 (citing Lawyers' Services Directive, supranote 93,
at art. 4(2), (5) (discussing two main conditions: an association requirement and the lawyers'
subjection to the professional rules of the host state).
100. Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 93, at art. 3.
101. Id. at art. 4(1).
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Member States may require that out-of-state lawyers in some legal practices
must associate and work alongside local counsel.1 02
B.

The European Court of Justice's Application of EU Law on CrossBorderLaw Practice

Similar in function to the U.S. Supreme Court in this context, the
European Court of Justice has jurisdiction and authority under the EEC Treaty
to interpret the Treaty as well as any subsequent directives issued to
implement and to guide Member States' application of the Treaty.1 03
Although there are only a small number of ECJ cases dealing directly with
Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty and the more recent Lawyers' Services
Directive, the ECJ has actively safeguarded, expanded, and firmly entrenched
the right to provide temporary cross-border legal practices throughout the
European Community Member States.1 04
The first case to definitively examine the scope of Article 59 (generally
establishing the freedom to provide services) and Article 60 (establishing the
right to provide temporary services) arose as an Article 177 preliminary
ruling 0 5 emanating from the Netherlands. In Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van
de Bedriffsvereniging voor de Metaalnilverheid (Board of the Trade
Association of the Metal Industry),106 the ECJ firmly established and

recognized the expansive scope of both Article 59 and Article 60.
The ECJ received the case after the Dutch social security appeals court
(Centrale Raad van Beroep) determined that Van Binsbergen's counsel, a
Dutch lawyer who had an established legal practice in the Netherlands,
became ineligible to represent Van Binsbergen in the legal proceeding before
the court.' 0 7 Particularly, the court relied on a Dutch law that required legal

representatives, per the "organization and rules of procedure of Netherlands
social service courts," to be established in the Netherlands. 108 Because Van
Binsbergen's counsel moved from the Netherlands to Belgium while the

102. Id. at art. 5.
103. See Goebel, supra note 75, at 308 n.3.
104. See Goebel, supra note 77, at 580-83, 606 (discussing the three cases which have
examined the 1977 Lawyers' Services Directive); Pender, supra note 14, at 1584.
105. EEC Treaty, supra note 75, at art. 177 (providing authority to the ECJ to make a
preliminary decision concerning the "interpretation of this Treaty" by reference from any
national or domestic court or tribunal). This judicial procedure is not unlike sending a certified
question on a point of law to another court in the U.S. system.
106. Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur Van de Bedrijfsvereniging Voor de
Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1300.
107. Id. at 1301.
108. Id.
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social security appeal was pending, the Dutch appeals court held that counsel
was no longer eligible to appear before the court and could no longer represent
Van Binsbergen under Dutch law.' 0 9 Thus, the Dutch appeals court asked the
ECJ to determine: (1) whether Articles 59 and 60-collectively establishing a
freedom to provide temporary cross-border legal services were directly
applicable to the Member States, and (2) if so, whether this Dutch national
law conflicts with the right established in Article 60 to provide temporary
legal services regardless of residency within the Member State. 10
First (and perhaps most importantly), the ECJ held that both Article 59
and Article 60 were, in fact, directly applicable to the Member States." This
is particularly important because it meant that the EEC-freedom to provide
services (including temporary cross-state services) is thereupon "binding in
Member States regardless of the existence of any national legislation, [and
therefore] provid[es] immediate rights to individuals that may be vindicated
in [any] national court or administrative proceeding" of the Member States." 2
Additionally, as to the second question posed to the EJC by the Dutch court,
it found that Articles 59 and 60 were specifically intended to foster the
"abolition of any restriction on freedom to provide services imposed by a
Member State .

.

. based on the fact that . .. [the] provision of services is an

act which, even though performed by a national of another Member State,
nevertheless entails the crossing of frontiers."11 3 Accordingly, the European
Court invalidated the Dutch law essentially a residency requirement for
legal practice-as necessarily incompatible with the established freedom of
lawyers to provide (temporary) cross-border services.114
However, the court did recognize, perhaps based on underlying
subterranean notions of state sovereignty, that Member States may
nonetheless impose "special condition[s] under the national law" so long as
those conditions are in the nature of pursuing the "general good."" 5 But the
court clarified that, regarding professional regulation of lawyers, these
conditions or regulations are only valid insofar as they apply equally to both
in-state and out-of-state lawyers practicing within the Member State.11 6 Thus,

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1312-13.
112. Goebel, supra note 77, at 567 (citing Case 167/37, Comm'n v. France, 1974 E.C.R.
359) (explaining the implications of the ECJ finding Article 48 to be directly applicable-i.e.,
having "direct effect").
113. Van Binsbergen, 1974 E.C.R. at 1307.
114. Id. at 1310 (holding the residency requirement necessarily denied nationals and
residents of other member states this recognized right).
115. Id. at 1309-10.
116. Id.
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Van Binsbergen quickly established three key principles underlying the much
less restricted temporary cross-border legal practice of the European legal
system: (1) The right and freedom to provide professional servicestemporarily or otherwise-is directly applicable to the Member States
regardless of any national legislation; (2) Member States cannot discriminate
against out-of-state lawyers, and any regulation that does so-including a
residency requirement that reaches into and affects temporary
multijurisdictional practice-is necessarily inconsistent with the established
rights and freedoms of the EEC; and (3) Member States may dictate and apply
non-discriminatory professional rules that are justified by the general good." 7
In large part, the Van Binsbergen decision demonstrated the need for
further and more concrete guidance concerning the application of Articles 59
and 60 to temporary cross-border legal practice within the European
Community. Enter the Lawyers' Services Directive. 1"
As noted above, the Lawyers' Services Directive played an important role
in clarifying and clearly articulating the limits to the apparent right to engage
in temporary cross-border legal practice under the EEC Treaty. For instance,
Article 5 of the Directive permits Member States to require that out-of-state
lawyers "work in conjunction" with a local lawyer.11 9 Although facially
similar to the local associational requirements found throughout MRPC 5.5
and various pro hac vice admissions standards, this exception to the general
rule of inter-state practice in the European context is much more limited in its
application than within the U.S. context, where it effectively acts as an
exception to the exception of the general rule against cross-border legal
practice.
First, the Lawyers' Services Directive permits a requirement of local
association only when the provision of legal service necessarily includes
"representation ... in legal proceedings."'20 By implication, then,
transactional, contractual, and all other non-litigation-related work seems to
be outside the scope of the requirement of local association. 121 Already, this
is a much narrower limitation than in the United States where local association
may be a valid requirement for any temporary cross-border legal practice, not
just for litigators (further restricting such practice).
In a second case, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal
Republic of Germany,122 the ECJ further limited valid applications of this

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id. at 1309, 1312.
Pender, supra note 14, at 1586 (citing Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 93).
Lawyers' Services Directive, supra note 93, at art. 5.
Id. (emphasis added).
Goebel, supra note 75, at 313.
Case 427/85, Comm'n v. Germany, 1988 E.C.R. 1154.
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condition on temporary cross-border lawyering. In 1988, the Commission of
the European Union, pursuant to Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, 2 3 challenged
a German law enacted in an attempt to implement this exception as laid out
under Article 5 of the Lawyers' Services Directive. In substance, the German
law mandated that out-of-state lawyers engaged in cross-border legal practice
within Germany must "act only in conjunction with a German lawyer" when
providing Germans with legal services and when appearing before a court.1 24
Furthermore, the law required that the local association itself must be able to
be "proved whenever a step is taken," and that a violation (i.e., not actively
associating with a local lawyer at any point in the legal representation/legal
proceedings) would effectively void the offending lawyers' legal actions.1 25
The ECJ ultimately ruled that by requiring out-of-state lawyers to
associate and work closely with local German counsel-especially when there
is "no requirement of representation by a lawyer"1 26-Germany had, for all
intents and purposes, vastly restricted the EEC-established right to
temporarily provide legal services in another Member State-as established
by Articles 59 and 60-rather than having merely implemented either the EEC
Treaty or Lawyers' Services Directive. 127 Notably, the court revealed its
interpretation and belief as to the purpose and goal of the Lawyers' Services
Directive, including Article 5, as to "facilitate the effective pursuit of the
activities of lawyers" by allowing out-of-state lawyers to freely provide
services on a temporary basis.1 28 Ultimately, by invalidating this law that, on
its face, seemed consistent with the plain language of the Lawyers' Service
Directive, the ECJ asserted that local association could only be required to the
extent and degree necessary to "support" the out-of-state lawyer's efforts to
comply with procedural and ethical rules.1 29 Moreover, in relation and in the
same case, and to a greater degree than within the United States context, the
ECJ both established and decisively upheld the rights of clients to have a

123. This provision allows the Commission to refer a case to the ECJ when it believes a
Member State has "failed to fulfil [any of its obligations] under [the EEC]." EEC Treaty, supra
note 75, at art. 169.
124. Germany, 1988 E.C.R. at 1155-56.
125. Id. at 1156.
126. Id. at 1166.
127. See id. at 1167-68.
128. Id. at 1158.
129. See id. at 1161-62; Goebel, supra note 77, at 581 (citing Germany, 1988 E.C.R. at
1160-63) (examining Commossion v. Germany and concluding that Article 5 does not require
the local lawyer to take a leading role in the representation or drafting or even to be
"continuously present" in court).

Published by Scholar Commons,

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
342

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 319

lawyer of their choosing over a Member State's concerns regarding crossborder legal practice. 130
Finally, in 1991, the ECJ implicitly reaffirmed its decision in Commission
v. Germany and continued to narrow the acceptable application of the local
association requirement by striking down a similar French law in Commission
of the European Communities v. French Republic.131 Similar in substance to
Germany's earlier attempted implementation of Article 5 of the Lawyers'
Services Directive, France enacted a law requiring foreign or out-of-state
lawyers to retain a local lawyer in civil cases specifically before the Regional
Court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) and the Court of Appeals (Cour
d'Appel).1 32 Here, unlike in Germany, the ECJ applied the plain language of
Article 5-allowing local association requirements when pursuing "activities
relating to the representation of a client in legal proceedings"-toinvalidate
France's version of a local association law.1 33
Importantly, the ECJ has expressly affirmed its commitment to the
foundational principles underlying Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC as well as
those found within the Lawyers' Services Directive: That the freedom to
provide legal services necessarily includes the freedom and right of out-ofstate lawyers to engage in temporary cross-border practice under the same
conditions and rules as are imposed upon in-state lawyers.1 34 So far, the ECJ
has consistently narrowly construed the few exceptions found within the
Lawyers' Services Directive to the general rule permitting temporary crossborder legal practice, thereby bolstering and firmly establishing an expansive
and broad European right to provide and engage in temporary cross-border
legal services.
V.

RECOGNIZING THE MODERN REALITY OF TEMPORARY CROSS-BORDER
LEGAL PRACTICE

While temporary cross-border legal practice and lawyer mobility is
becoming more accepted within the United States, it still remains the
exception rather than the rule. This remains true even though nearly every

130. See Germany, 1988 E.C.R. at 1161-62; Goebel, supra note 75, at 337-38 (citing
Germany, 1988 E.C.R. at 1162) (noting that within the state court's discretion particularly
concerningpro hac vice admission, U.S. clients have no established right to be represented by
an out-of-state lawyer).
131. Case C-294/89, Comm'n v. France, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3606.
132. Id. at 1-3608.
133. Id. at 1-3610-11 (emphasis added) (invalidating the law, in part, on the grounds that
it was invalid as-applied to activities before authorities with no judicial function and when the
assistance of a lawyer is not compelled under French law).
134. See id. at 1-3612.
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state has adopted Rule 5.5(c) in some form-a rule the ABA heavily amended
in the early 2000s to address the outdated UPL rules that unnecessarily
constrained the legal profession. Nonetheless, temporary cross-border
practice in the United States continues to be fundamentally limited as much
by underlying notions of federalism that promote states' rights and
independence-especially in prescribing regulations of the legal profession
itself-as the individual rules of professional conduct (i.e., allowing
temporary cross-border practice but only under certain limited and discrete
circumstances). On the other end of the spectrum is the European model,
where temporary cross-border legal practice is the rule rather than merely a
limited exception.
Today, more than ever, not only is "the practice of law ... important to
the national economy,"1 35 but it is an important component to the American
system both domestically and abroad. Lawyers provide a necessary service
that impacts all aspects of society by framing and guiding our social and
business relationships, as well as in upholding and imposing the rule of law.
In this context, states have begun to recognize-either willingly or
unwillingly the importance and arguable necessity of permitting crossborder multijurisdictional law practice. For example, although state-specific
bar exams have long been served as a form of self-imposed consumer
protection to ensure competence,1 36 more states continue to adopt the Uniform
Bar Examination as part of their licensing scheme, creating a national
licensing framework made necessary by the characteristics of the modem
legal profession. 137 This is a move in the right direction, reflecting programs
that other countries have also begun to implement.1 38 However, the changing
legal landscape requires more than just a uniform program for licensing and
regulation (although it is important); rather, it also requires an understanding
and recognition that today's legal issues are highly mobile and not constrained
by geographic or political borders.
As the legal landscape continues to evolve without regard to borders,
allowing more expansive cross-border law practice as a domestic matter
within the United States is important as U.S. law becomes increasingly

135. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985).
136. See Davis, supra note 12, at 1344.
137. See Jurisdictions That Have Adopted the UBE, NAT'L CONF. B. EXAM'RS,
http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (thirty-four out of fifty-six U.S.
jurisdictions have so far adopted the UBE).
138. See Laurel S. Terry, TransnationalLegal Practice (International),47 YEAR IN REV.
(ABA) 485 (2013) (recognizing Canada, in particular, has begun developing uniform standards
to foster and to be competitive in the world of transnational legal practice by promoting uniform
standards for lawyer admission, professional rules, mobility, and foreign lawyer admission).
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nationalized,1 39 allowing the United States to continue to be a worldwide
leader and competitor in an increasingly globalized economy.1 40 As we
continue to implement and pursue a more nationalized program of
professional licensing and regulation while also incorporating the flexibility
of technology in legal practice both necessary to remain competitive and to
meet the needs of the modem legal framework a necessary corollary is
recognizing (and resolving) how the historically protectionist UPL rules
actually constrain and prevent the competent, thorough, and effective
lawyering the rules of professional conduct seek to effectuate. As cross-border
legal practice continues to become a modem reality on a temporary, let alone
continual basis, failing to recognize this necessity and constraining lawyers
with strict and expansive UPL rules and only limited MJP avenues will
unnecessarily constrain lawyers seeking to abide by the prescribed rules of
professional conduct while at the same time trying to meet the modem needs
of their clients and provide competent and effective legal representation.
Freely allowing temporary cross-border legal practice does not mean we
cannot also uphold the high levels of professionalism and competence each
state desires for the legal services provided to its citizens; we can and
shoulddo both.
VI. CONCLUSION

As globalization continues to drive multijurisdictional structures,
relationships, and interactions, all lawyers will inevitably be faced with the
need to file a brief, conduct a negotiation, draft a contract, or appear before a
court in a jurisdiction different from their own no matter how local they
perceive their practice to be. The lessons learned in dealing with the changing
nature of temporary cross-border legal practice-including the struggles and
implications of the hierarchy of values that are ultimately protected are
particularly informative and useful for the future. The United States, grounded
in principles of federalism, values states' rights and liberties above economic
and professional integration by leaving professional regulation of lawyers to
the states; even in a profession that has such large national (and societal)
significance. States persist within the United States in implementing
protectionist-motivated regulation of lawyers, leaving temporary cross-border

139. See James W. Jones et al., Reforming Lawyer Mobility Protecting Turf or Serving
Clients?, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 140-42 (2017) (recognizing the average legal
practitioner inherently engages in a nationalized legal practice because of the expansive body of
law that expands beyond and without regard to state borders including federal law and uniform
codes).
140. See id. at 187-88.
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legal practice a restricted exception to the general rule. Alternatively, with its
program of vast economic integration and professional rights, the European
Community values integration and a nationalization in terms of the European
Community system of law practice, making temporary cross-border legal
practice the established rule with only limited exceptions.
Quite simply, the future of the legal profession is one where all
practitioners are faced with cross-border legal issues on a more-thantemporary basis. As our globalized world becomes all-the-more
interconnected, the issue of multijurisdictional legal practice will continue to
evolve and will remain an important facet of both global economies and legal
systems. Accordingly, the best approach to future regulation in an everchanging world is to understand where we are, where we have been, and
where we need to go in all aspects of cross-border, multijurisdictional legal
practice.
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